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In this manuscript, we introduce a new measure of political influence in California. Leveraging a new dataset of candidate rankings of their own endorsements, we use the Bradley-Terry model to estimate influence for a broad array of officeholders, interest groups, and endorsing organizations who participate in California politics. We call this new measure of influence Clout scores. Our measure of a person's clout is based on how much candidates for office desire that individual's endorsement. Specifically, we measure a political actor's clout by estimating the extent to which that actor's endorsement is preferred to a baseline endorsement group. Our estimates provide an original, empirically-grounded portrait of the distribution of political capital in California and highlight which political elites have the greatest capacity to swing election outcomes.

Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred means for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries. Adapted from the source document.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Introduction and Overview -- Part I. ATTRIBUTIONS OF POWER -- 1. Power and Probability -- 2. Attributions of Interpersonal Power -- Part II. THE SOURCE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE -- 3. The Nature of Trust -- 4. The Powerholder -- Part III. THE TARGET OF INFLUENCE -- 5. Further Thoughts on the Processes of Compliance, Identification, and Internalization -- 6. The Comparative Analysis of Power and Power Preference -- Part IV. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL-SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS -- 7. Power and Utilities in a Simulated Interreligious Council: A Situational Approach to Interparty Decision-Making -- Part V. POLITICAL POWER -- 8. Power in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Tribal Politics -- 9. Legitimacy as a Base of Social Influence -- 10. Campus Crisis: The Search for Power -- Part VI. THE MEANS OF INFLUENCE -- 11. Economic Power -- Index

Abstract
Do foreign firms engage in domestic politics, and if so, why? I argue that foreign firms, impacted by US policies, employ subsidiaries in the US to represent their political interests in federal elections. Using original data collected for the population of corporate givers during the 2014 and 2016 election cycles, I find US subsidiaries of foreign firms to be significantly more politically active than similarly sized American firms located in the same industry. These subsidiaries are much more likely to sponsor a Political Action Committee and donate in greater amounts. I explore a variety of explanations for this disproportionate political activity, and demonstrate that it is driven in part by the foreign parent firms' desire to gain a political foothold in the United States. Foreign direct investment therefore serves as an investment in political influence.

The establishment of autonomous public bodies during the past two decades has created a highly fragmented public sector. Using a dataset with more than 200 Dutch public sector organisations, this article examines three related sets of questions: to what extent a relationship exists between formal and de facto autonomy; the level of influence that interested parties exert upon those organizations; whether a relationship exists between levels of formal and de facto autonomy and the level of influence exercised by these parties. We find that formal autonomy does not reinforce de facto autonomy; organizations with less autonomy report higher levels of political influence when policy autonomy is concerned; and that organizations with more autonomy report higher societal influence on their financial autonomy.

Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries

Explores the question of utility of force in circumstances where there is no immediate danger of war, based on Soviet military power in Europe in the 1970s; implications for armed forces of the Atlantic alliance. Edited text of the sixth John Vincent Memorial Lecture, delivered at the University of Keele, Great Britain, May 8, 1998.

A theory of religious influence on political behavior -- Social networks and church structure: congregations, small groups, informal contacts -- Clergy influences and religious commitment reconsidered: reconciling old and new influences on political behavior -- Church-centered influences on public opinion -- The resourceful believer: generating civic skills in church -- The construction of political mobilization in churches -- Present but not accounted for: churches, institutional treatment, and gender differences in civic resources

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.